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Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques: The Social 
and Doctrinal Importance of Saudi Arabia in Indonesian 
Salafi Discourse
Chris Chaplin
► Chaplin, C. (2014). Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques: The social and doctrinal importance 
of Saudi Arabia in Indonesian Salafi discourse. ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7(2), 
217-236. 
The emergence of Salafi Islam within Indonesia has shifted the imaginary boundaries of 
Islamic identity. Although relatively small in numbers, Salafis propagate a religious dis-
course linked to scholars in Saudi Arabia. While it cannot be regarded as merely a type of 
‘Saudization’, the kingdom is frequently exemplified as a model for a pious society as well 
as pragmatic solutions on how to deal with contemporary issues ranging from justice to 
terrorism. Indeed, Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal part in the Salafi imaginary, balancing a 
historical Islamic past with a modernist religious present and future. Based on fieldwork 
conducted from 2011 to 2012 in Yogyakarta, this paper builds upon this premise, offering 
both a description and an analysis of the importance of the kingdom as a source of edu-
cational sponsorship but also, more interestingly, as a source of religious authority and 
social ideals, articulated within contemporary religious literature and the movement’s 
study sessions (kajian). More pointedly, I argue that actors use Saudi Arabia to construct 
an imaginary ideal through which social and religious issues are contemplated and com-
pared to apparent Indonesian ‘social corruption’.
Keywords: Indonesia; Religious Renewal; Salafism; Saudi Arabia; Social Imaginaries

Mit dem Auftreten des Salafismus in Indonesien wurden die imaginären Grenzen is-
lamischer Identität verschoben. Obwohl sie nicht zahlreich sind, propagieren Sala-
fistInnen einen Diskurs, der sich auf Gelehrte in Saudi-Arabien bezieht. Während der 
Salafismus nicht bloß als eine Art von „Saudisierung“ angesehen werden kann, wird 
das Königreich oft als Modell für eine fromme Gesellschaft sowie für pragmatische 
Lösungen betreffend Fragen von Gerechtigkeit bis Terrorismus dargestellt. In der Tat 
spielt Saudi-Arabien eine zentrale Rolle in der salafistischen Vorstellung, indem es 
eine historische islamische Vergangenheit mit einer modernen Gegenwart und Zu-
kunft ausgleicht. Basierend auf Feldforschung in Yogyakarta von 2011 bis 2012 baut 
dieser Artikel auf den oben genannten Annahmen auf und analysiert die Bedeutung 
des Königreichs als Quelle für Bildungsförderung und, noch interessanter, als Quel-
le religiöser Autorität und sozialer Ideale, dargeboten in zeitgenössischer religiöser 
Literatur und in studentischen Versammlungen der Bewegung (kajian). Es wird gezeigt, 
dass Saudi-Arabien für die Konstruktion eines imaginären Ideals verwendet wird, durch 
das soziale und religiöse Themen betrachtet werden und "soziale Korruption" in Indone-
sien verdeutlicht wird.
Schlagworte: Indonesien; Religiöse Erneuerung; Salafismus; Saudi-Arabien; Soziale Vorstellungen
Aktuelle Südostasienforschung  Current Research on Southeast Asia
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INTRODUCTION
The emergence of Salafi Islam within Indonesia has, for its adherents, shifted the 
imaginary and ethical boundaries of Islamic identity. Although relatively small in 
numbers, Salafis propagate a religious discourse linked to scholars and educational 
institutions in Saudi Arabia that they believe emulate the Salaf al-Salih (which they 
interpret as the first three generations of Muslims). While it cannot be regarded as 
merely a type of ‘Saudization’, the Land of the Two Holy Mosques plays a pivotal 
part in the Salafi imaginary, balancing a historical Islamic past with an ideal religious 
future. Frequently exemplified, Saudi Arabia is not only the caretaker of Islam’s most 
holy sites, but provides a model for an imagined pious society (compared to the per-
ceived immorality of Indonesia) as well as pragmatic solutions on how to deal with 
contemporary issues from justice to terrorism.
Based on fieldwork conducted from 2011 to 2012 in Yogyakarta, this paper ex-
plores the importance of the Saudi kingdom among Salafis as a source of educational 
and financial sponsorship, but also, more interestingly, as a place of religious author-
ity and ideals. I approach the subject through a focus on religious literature and study 
sessions (kajian) prevalent in Yogyakarta. My line of enquiry does not relate to a sin-
gular foundation or group, but rather looks more widely at a variety of agents active 
under the label ‘Salafi’ within the religious landscape. In doing so, I maintain that 
Salafism is a broad, translocal, multi-layered, and multi-stranded social movement 
that encapsulates a variety of different actors, institutions, and foundations. It is sus-
tained not through any singular organizational structure, but through the lived expe-
riences, divergences, and multiple ways in which it is ‘enacted’ within a given locale. 
In Yogyakarta, its proponents include (but are not exclusive to) Wahdah Islamiyah, the 
Yayasan Majelis At-Turots al-Islamy (At-Turots al-Islamy Foundation, At-Turots), and 
Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-Atsary (YPIA, al-Atsary Islamic Education Foundation). 
These actors often differ and disagree in the modes and methods through which they 
promote Salafi teachings, not shying away from contention in relation to religious 
practice. Yet, they nevertheless share similar global linkages and utilize Saudi Arabia 
in remarkably similar ways. Indeed, the use of Saudi sources and imaginaries in order 
to promote specific religious practices is perhaps a crucial overarching characteristic 
that conjoins a variety of ‘Salafi’ strands throughout Indonesia. 
Through a description of the ways Salafi doctrine ‘travels’ (Said, 1983) and is 
‘framed’ (Benford & Snow, 1986), I argue that the image of Saudi Arabia is used by 
actors to construct an imaginary ideal through which social and religious issues are 
reflected. For Salafis, any religious decision must find its legitimacy in Saudi sources. 
Further, Saudi society itself is utilized as a model of piety that adherents should strive 
towards. Yet, while this imaginary is built on real links and experiences, it fails to 
move beyond a normative set of values and look at the complexities and nuances of 
Saudi society itself. Moreover, as Salafism is not based on any unifying organizational 
and hierarchical ‘center’, its spread depends as much on global linkages as it does 
on the ability of local agents to adapt religious resources to a given context. Conse-
quently, the need to recompose global sources at the local level inevitably requires a 
level of adaptation that creates a degree of distance from any idealized image of Saudi 
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Arabia. This does not render the image ineffectual, but rather, for Salafis, it becomes 
part of an ‘emancipatory desire’ constantly insisted upon, even if impossible to enact.
FRAMING SALAFISM AND RELIGIOUS LEGITIMACY
Prior to analyzing the modes through which particular socio-historical images 
of an Islamic society and Saudi Arabia penetrate Indonesian Salafi discourse, a de-
scriptive account as to what I mean by the term Salafism (and Salafism in Indonesia, 
more specifically) is needed. The phrase derives from the phrase as-salaf, referring to 
‘those who came before us’. It is commonly utilized in Islamic thought to denote the 
companions of the Prophet Muhammad and, generally, those who believe they fol-
low the examples of these early generations (Hassim, 2010). Indeed, despite its recent 
popularity as a ‘catch-all’ phrase to label a variety of conservative Islamic groups with 
significant theological differences (for example, see Fradkin, 2008), the importance of 
the term Salafi can be traced to earlier periods of Islamic history. Hassim, for example, 
states that it was commonly used in the Abbasid era to distinguish ‘guided’ Muslims 
from those that deviated from the orthodox creed, although he also stresses that it 
was used before this period (Hassim, 2010). Steeped in Islamic historical significance, 
‘Salafi’ thus resonates among Islamic advocates and has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been 
applied to a variety of factions claiming to uphold Islamic traditions. In Indonesia, 
for instance, the organizations Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (PERSIS, Islamic 
Unity) have often been referred to as having ‘Salafi’ elements due to their use of the 
turn-of-the-nineteenth-century reformist ideas of the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh 
and his colleagues – also popularly denoted as the Salafiyya (Hassim, 2010).1
As important as this is, I do not wish to delve too deeply into the nuances concern-
ing the variety of theologians and movements who lay claim to the phrase. Rather, 
returning to the topic at hand, this brief description underlines not only the signifi-
cance of the term, but also the importance in qualifying to whom one refers when ap-
plying it (and indeed what they themselves mean when engaging with the term). My 
description thus utilizes ‘Salafi’ fairly narrowly in reference to a broad social move-
ment that entered Indonesia during the 1980s and has links to several scholars who 
studied at Islamic universities in the Saudi kingdom. Referring to itself as a particular 
manhaj (methodology), the movement aims to ‘literally’ apply Islamic principles in 
order to emulate the Salaf al-Salih (by which they specifically refer to the first three 
generations of Muslims – the Sahabah, Tabi’un, and Tabi’ al-Tabi’in) in every aspect of 
one’s life. Following a rigid adherence to tawhid (monotheism) as well as to the athari 
aqida (creed) (while most Indonesian Muslims traditionally followed the ash’ari aqi-
da), Salafis condemn any ‘contextualization’ of Islamic practice as well as any custom 
that may taint one’s absolute commitment to God – such as celebrating the prophet 
Muhammad’s birthday or visiting the graves of Islamic saints. In its place, they believe 
in a need for rigid adherence to the Qur’an and Sunnah, although it is notable that 
the way they study hadith is unique given the importance of Muhammad Nasir al-
Din al-Albani (1914–1999), who questioned the authenticity of approximately 990 ha-
1 The use of the term Salafiyya represented Abduh’s ideal of re-engaging with Islamic texts by going 
back to the main ‘sources’ of the Qur’an and Sunnah in order to find an Islamic synthesis with concepts 
of modernity.
220 Chris Chaplin  ASEAS 7(2)
dith considered authentic by most scholars (Kamaruddin, 2004). It is, moreover, what 
Mahmood (2005, p. 81)describes as a “post-madhaab” form of Islamic religiosity that 
believes one cannot solely follow a particular ‘tradition’ or school of jurisprudence 
but, rather, must engage personally with Islamic principles and practice.
Socio-historically, Salafism emerged from the University of Madinah during the 
1960s, particularly among the followers of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, who 
taught at the university’s Faculty of Hadith Studies. Although sharing similarities and 
quickly building bridges with several other global movements – such as the Ahl-e 
Hadith in South Asia – the Saudi roots of contemporary Salafism have led several 
observers to link it to the ‘Wahhabism’ of the kingdom’s religious elite (Al-Rasheed, 
2007; Roy, 2004). While correct in pointing out a similar set of historical references 
and socio-conservative values between the two, we must remember that conflating 
Salafism and Wahhabism ignores the level of contention within the Saudi religious 
‘field’, often between the institutionalized ‘Wahhabism’ of the aimat al-Da’wa al-na-
jdiyya (religious notables of Najd) and those who propagate a variety of other religious 
positions – including Salafism (Lacroix, 2011). Indeed, the rise of Salafism occurred 
much to the ire of the Wahhabi elite at the time; they even successfully conspired 
to deny al-Albani an extension of his visa in 1963 after he criticized Muhammad Bin 
Abd’ al-Wahhab’s (the āl-Shaykh) reading of hadith. Al-Albani’s followers, referred to 
as the Ahl al-Hadith movement, who later grew into the Jama’ah Salafiyyah Muhtasiba 
(loosely translated as the Salafi jama’ah (group) that practice hisba, or the command-
ing of right and forbidding of wrong) thus began to promote a set of beliefs that 
challenged several tenants of Wahhabi thought, including, but not limited to, their 
approach to hadith as well as adherence to the Hanbali madhaab.
In this light, Salafism is perhaps best thought of as a reconstituted Wahhabism 
(Hasan, 2010), sharing several socio-conservative and theological similarities in rela-
tion to aqida, but also decoupled from the historical-scholastic lineage of the aimat 
al-Da’wa al-najdiyya and traditional fiqih (jurisprudence). They have fallen in and out 
of favor with the religious and political elite of the kingdom, most notably during 
the 1970s when the Jama’ah Salafiyyah Muhtasiba was subject to state repression, 
especially after some of its former members laid siege to the Grand Mosque in Mecca 
in 1979. Yet, Salafism was also fortunate enough to benefit from influential support, 
especially due to the intimacy between its followers and the influential Bin Baz, who 
was a senior member of the Majlis Hay’a Kibar al-Ulama (Council of the Committee 
of Senior Ulama) and became grand mufti from 1993 to 1999. Bin Baz, the first grand 
mufti not to originate from the family of Muhammad al-Wahhab, was well respected 
among Wahhabi scholars, never fully aligning with any religious ‘camp’ but rather 
mediating between religious factions within the kingdom. It was often at his behest 
and intervention that activists formerly involved in the Ahl al-Hadith and Jama’ah 
Salafiyyah Muhtasiba received light treatment from Saudi authorities during several 
periods of political repression (Lacroix, 2011).
By the 1980s, Bin Baz’s influence led many Salafi ulama to engage with – and 
sit on – a variety of Saudi-sanctioned Islamic institutions including the Council of 
the Committee of Senior Ulama. Not only did this provide space for Salafi religious 
scholars, but it also endowed them with funding through which to facilitate religious 
programs, sermons, and social initiatives, often with little state oversight (Lacroix, 
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2011). It also coincided with a marked increase in funding for international religious 
programs. Shaken by the challenge of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the seizure of 
the Grand Mosque in Mecca in the same year, and the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan, Saudi authorities augmented their drive to dress themselves in religious colors 
abroad (Al-Rasheed, 2008). Although Salafi scholars initially suffered from repression 
given the involvement of some of their former followers in the seizure of the Grand 
Mosque, their collusion with and loyalty to Saudi Arabia in relation to the war in 
Afghanistan brought them back into the fold (Lacroix, 2011). 
This inevitably allowed activists to build bridges, provide scholarships, and con-
struct mosques throughout the world – a process well documented in the work of 
Meijer (2009), but also within analyses pertaining to Salafism in Germany (Wurger, 
2013), Ethiopia (Ostebo, 2011), and Yemen (Bonnefoy, 2011). Underlining the aesthet-
ical and referential similarities amongst Salafis – all of whom reference similar reli-
gious scholars and sport either jalabiyaa (robes), beards, or the niqab (full veil) if they 
are women while avoiding isbal (trousers beyond the ankle) – such studies empha-
sized the commonalities and shared imaginative power of a ‘global umma’ utilized 
by a variety of actors throughout the world. Yet, they also highlight how the spread 
of Salafism is not the result of an organized state-based campaign, but has often cir-
cumvented direct state institutions and embedded itself in a variety of landscapes by 
transforming and recomposing itself in relation to the necessities of a given locale. 
Indeed, its increased global appeal had as much to do with Saudi Arabia’s greater fi-
nancial power as it did with wider global social transformations – mass urban migra-
tion, increased education, the ‘failure’ of Cold War ideologies, and the advent of mass 
communication tools, all of which led to a qualitative shift in religiosity both globally 
(Mandaville, 2007; Roy, 2004) and in Indonesia (Effendy, 2003; Feely & White, 2008; 
Hasan, 2006; Sidel, 2006). 
The resurgence of Islamic identity from the 1980s onwards was, as studies have 
shown, not linked to any established form of Islamic authority, but came to rely on an 
individual’s ability to reflexively think of oneself as primarily Muslim and to consider 
what this meant vis-à-vis the state, one’s peers, the wider community, and market 
forces. Consequently, this presents a challenge to delineating a coherent Salafism. 
For example, from a social movement perspective, ‘resource or political mobiliza-
tion’ (for example, see McAdam & McCarthy, 1996) is, given Salafism’s frequent lack 
of explicit political mobilization, inadequate. The movement, rather than having a 
specific framework for engaging state and society, is based on what Hassim (2010) 
labels a particular ‘paradigm of thought’ that leads to a set of discursive practices 
drawing on a similar theological and socio-historical disposition. It remains a social 
movement, however, one that does not have clear-cut boundaries or objectives, pre-
ferring to be enriched through multi-layered and multi-directional characteristics, 
representing an enmeshment of people and lived experiences. In adopting such a 
definition, I borrow from the work of Lehmann and Siebzehner (2006) who, through 
their study of the Shas (Sephardic ‘orthodox’ religious political party in Israel), high-
light how a multi-directional religious movement can reshape the intricacies and the 
very boundaries of a religio-ethnic community. Social movements often do not have 
specific objectives or even a defined set of ideas, but rather exist as the object of alle-
giance by individuals, whose own actions, built upon what Bayat (2005, pp. 891–908) 
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terms “imagined solidarities”, endow the movement with new debates, programs, 
and strands. 
This approach allows us to encapsulate a variety of Salafi ‘strands’ in our analysis 
that, while varying in their scope and nuances, can be tied together through similar 
linkages, both real and referential. Moreover, if we were to ‘epidemiologically’ trace 
their history in Indonesia, we could see several similar roots such as the founding of 
the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA, Institute for Arabic and Islamic 
Knowledge, a branch of the Riyadh-based Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University) 
in Jakarta in 1980, an increase in scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia through the 
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), 
an influx of Saudi-trained scholars, and a crisis in Islamic authority linked to political 
repression by Suharto’s New Order. Indeed, for many young Muslims who, through 
rapid urbanization and access to educational facilities, neither identified with the 
belief system (Islamic or otherwise) of their parents’ generation nor the official Pan-
casila ideology of the state, Islam provided an ideational reference point through 
which one could embody a modern identity. This process not only led to a form of 
religiosity that Fealy (2008, p. 15) believed penetrated further into social, cultural, and 
political life than ever before, but also an influx of scholastic works linked to ‘global’ 
movements including – but not exclusive to – Salafism.
Prior to continuing, it is important to point out that the emphasis on the Hejaz 
and Middle East more broadly – a key part of Salafi discourse – is not new to Indone-
sian Islam.2 Indeed, the requirement of every able Muslim to undergo the Hajj points 
to the importance of the region for the religion as a whole. For Muslims in Southeast 
Asia, moreover, the Hejaz has constituted a marked source of scholarly work and reli-
gious legitimacy, with people, resources, and ideas continuously flowing from one to 
the other (see, for example, the collection edited by Tagiliacozzo, 2009). Ahmad Dah-
lan and KH Hasyim Asy’ari, the founders of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, 
respectively, both studied in Mecca. It was also in Mecca that the Sumatran scholar 
Ahmad Khatib became the Great Imam of the Shafi’i madhaab at the Haram mosque 
in 1876 and taught many would-be reformist Southeast Asian Muslims – who would 
later become pivotal actors within the anti-colonial religious movement in the Dutch 
East Indies (Djamal, 1998). In this light, the Hejaz was not only a source of spiritual 
and intellectual inspiration, but was also entwined with a variety of religious reform 
movements within the Southeast Asian archipelago.
Yet, for many Indonesian religious organizations, the twentieth century also 
witnessed a shift in importance away from the region and towards the archipelago 
itself. The creation of new religious organizations – most notably Muhammadiyah 
and Nahdlatul Ulama – alongside the emergence of an Indonesian nationalist pro-
ject, shifted the political and religious focus to one concerned primarily with defining 
the position of ‘Islam’ within the new nation state (for example, see Effendy, 2003). 
Notably, this also occurred at a time when the Saudi kingdom was consolidating its 
rule and promoting the religious principles of the aimat al-Da’wa al-najdiyya, whose 
social conservative and puritanical pretenses were at odds with the theology and/
2 The Hejaz contains the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the former of which is where all able-bodied 
Muslims are obliged to undergo pilgrimage. The cities have not only been sacred to Muslim history, but 
also provided a crucial location for scholarship and study.
223Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques
or social concerns of Indonesia’s religious organizations. Indeed, although Abdulaziz 
ibn Saud held a pan-Islamic conference in Mecca in 1926 in order to confer some 
‘global’ legitimacy to his rule of the Hejaz, this was of little significance to Islamic 
mobilization during 1920s Indonesia – despite the fact that Nahdlatul Ulama had to 
an extent been created to provide representation to ‘traditional’ Islamic scholars at 
this very conference.
The emergence of Salafi thought in 1980s Indonesia, which re-engaged with the 
imaginary potential of the Hejaz and a ‘global umma’, correlated with a crisis of le-
gitimacy within established religious organizations whose need to align with New 
Order policy and Indonesia-centric focus appealed little to a generation looking for 
a ‘pure and universal’ Islam. Wahdah Islamiyah – whose Yogyakarta branch forms 
part of this case study – provides a case in point as it emerged from university stu-
dents in Makassar who were traditionally aligned to Muhammadiyah. Breaking away 
from Muhammadiyah in 1984 after the organization was forced to adopt Pancasila as 
its founding principle, these students established their own foundation (Jurdi, 2007, 
2012; Nisa, 2012). Benefiting from LIPIA scholarships and funding links to Saudi in-
stitutions and donors (facilitated through old Muhammadiyah and DDII contacts), 
these students were able to study abroad as well as set up a propagation program that 
disseminated Salafi texts amongst university and high school students before finally 
establishing the Wahdah Islamiyah community organization (organisasi masyarakat/ 
ormas) in 2002. It is more politically nuanced than most Salafi foundations (as it has 
an agreement with the Indonesian Department of Social Affairs to provide social wel-
fare to remote areas in parts of Indonesia) and also, unlike the majority of Salafi bo- 
dies, has a national structure with an extensive caderization system and approxi-
mately 70 branches across Indonesia.
In Yogyakarta – the primary geographical focus of my fieldwork – it was the activi-
ties of Abu Nida (full name Chamsaha Sofwan) that provided a foundational foothold 
for Salafi thought. Born in East Java and educated at the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud 
University in Riyadh, he arrived in the city in 1985 and, through the assistance of 
the DDII, began to lecture to students at Gadjah Madah University (UGM). Becom-
ing popular among students, these lectures quickly expanded to the campuses of the 
School of Middle Technology and Yogyakarta State University. Yet, during the 1990s, 
when Suharto’s administration enacted a policy of rapprochement to non-political 
forms of Islamic organization that Salafis embedded themselves permanently within 
the locality. In 1992, Abu Nida invited several scholars including Jafar Umar Thalib, 
Muhammad As-Sewed, and Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas to join him and together 
they established a mosque in Degolan, Sleman (northern Yogyakarta, Central Java). 
This was to become a Euclidean point for religious learning, although no sooner had 
Salafism imbibed itself within Yogyakarta than a rift among its adherents emerged. 
Jafar Umar Thalib, a charismatic preacher who had spent time in Yemen, became 
highly critical of several of his cohorts including Abu Nida, believing their coopera-
tion with non-Salafi student groups and donors (such as DDII) was contrary to the 
‘purity’ of the movement. In the course of the 1990s, these strains became increas-
ingly intractable, dividing the movement to this day (Hasan, 2006; International Cri-
sis Group [ICG], 2004). Jafar’s brand of Salafism, and its rise to national prominence 
after the fall of Suharto, has received much attention by regional and international 
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social scientists (Hasan, 2006; ICG, 2004; Wahid, 2006). Indeed, Hasan (2006) has 
expertly documented the way Jafar Umar Thalib mobilized his followers into the 
Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah and Laskar Jihad, who then partook 
in sectarian violence in Maluku. Yet, a topic that has been less frequently visited is 
the expansion of the opposing strand of Salafism represented by Abu Nida and his 
Majelis At-Turots al-Islamy as well as that of Wahdah Islamiyah (notable exceptions 
are ICG, 2004; Jurdi, 2004, 2007; Nisa, 2012a, 2012b). Indeed, similar to Jafar, Abu 
Nida’s At-Turots underwent efflorescence during the 1990s, opening several educa-
tional institutes, such as the Ma’had Jamilurrahman As-Salafi and building a ‘Salafi’ vil-
lage in Wirokerten, Yogyakarta (of which the Ma’had Jamilurrahman As-Salafi is the 
centerpiece). Unlike Jafar, however, the At-Turots maintained strong financial links 
to the Arabian Peninsula and, after the fall of Suharto, was able to utilize these not to 
mobilize politically but to focus on propagation. The group has grown dramatically, 
establishing the pesantren Islamic Centre Bin Baz (ICBB), a hospital, medical training 
facility, several housing complexes, a radio station as well as an expansive propaga-
tion program that its adherents claim stretches all the way to Sorong, West Papua 
(anonymous informant, personal communication, Jakarta, 6 July 2011 & Yogyakarta, 
13 November 2011).3
The ICBB – which consists of a kindergarten, primary and high school and in-
cludes students from Malaysia, Timor-Leste, and Australia – has become a nodal 
point not only for At-Turots, but also for a wider network of Salafi actors within the 
city. Activists linked to the ICBB have played a pivotal part in establishing and assist-
ing in the creation of other Salafi foundations, including the Yayasan Pendidikan Is-
lam al-Atsary (YPIA). Although it became an official foundation in 2007, YPIA’s roots 
lie in kajian organized by and for students at UGM in 2000. Notably, this was an era 
of increased Islamic mobilization and anxiety (Sidel, 2006), marked by the rise not 
only of new Islamic political parties, but also increasing ‘sectarian’ conflicts in Ma-
luku, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi (especially Poso). For many of the initial participants 
of these sessions, a ‘pure’ or ‘non-political’ Islam not privy to the mass Islamic politi-
cal mobilization, formation of religious political parties, and sectarian conflicts was 
an important part of the appeal of this strand of Salafism. Consequently, YPIA grew 
into a more organized body that offers structured Islamic classes, provides boarding 
and accommodation, runs a radio station and several websites, and produces several 
weekly bulletins it disperses throughout the city. By 2006, Wahdah Islamiyah also 
made inroads into Yogyakarta after participating in a Salafi conference concerning 
the evils of Shi’ism. Quickly gaining a following among the city’s students, it was not 
long before an official branch office was opened and Wahdah Islamiyah initiated an 
Arabic language course, an after hours educational program for adults, a student hall, 
and a coordinated lecture program. It also aligned itself with several Salafi preach-
ers linked to the Pesantren Al-Madinah Nusantara (established in 2001). The school, 
founded by Ridwan Hamidi, trains Da’i (preachers) who then preach throughout ru-
ral Java and has become a pivotal part in the Wahdah Islamiyah rubric.
3 Given the political sensitivities revolving around the concept of Salafism, I have kept all interviewees 
anonymous to reduce any intended risk towards them as well as, from a methodological standpoint, to 
remain true to a ‘do no harm’ research framework.
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EDUCATIONAL AND FINANCIAL NETWORKS
The Salafi groups briefly described above are independent from each other despite 
scholars frequently moving between different foundations and occasionally working 
together. They exemplify the loose and multiple ways through which Salafism has 
entered the religious landscape and the multivariate ways through which it can be 
‘enacted’ in Indonesian society. Yet, these activists share a commonality in the way 
they utilize Saudi Arabia within their discourse and propagation. It is also important 
to note that despite the ‘imaginary’ power the kingdom has in Salafi discourse, such 
networks share real funding and scholastic linkages. Indeed, while Salafis linked to 
Jafar Umar Thalib (who believe themselves to be ‘purists’) refuse ‘organized’ funding 
streams, the donor bodies of Jam’iyah Ihya’ At-Turats Al-Islami (Kuwait) and Jam’iyah 
Darul Birr have provided support for Abu Nida’s At-Turots as well as Wahdah Islami-
yah in Makassar (Mujahid, 2012). Several of these Indonesian foundations have be-
come adept at soliciting donations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to build religious 
facilities. For example, Wahdah Islamiyah recently opened a new office and mosque 
complex in Yogyakarta through the financial assistance of a private donor in Kuwait 
while At-Turots received a donation towards its ICBB from the Saudi embassy in 
early 2013 after the ambassador visited the foundation.
These linkages extend to a variety of educational institutions including the LIPIA 
in Jakarta as well as facilities in Yemen or Saudi Arabia. The most predominant of 
these is the Islamic University of Madinah, Wahdah Islamiyah claims almost 60 of 
its members have studied there (anonymous informant, Wahdah Islamiyah, personal 
communication, 17 December 2011) while several ustadz (preacher) working with At-
Turots and YPIA have also attended the university. The Islamic University of Madi-
nah also plays a more intimate role; it offers accreditation for religious schools that 
meet a certain standard of religious learning. In Yogyakarta and Central Java these 
include ICBB, but also the Pesantren Iman Bukhari in Solo and Pesantren Islam Al-
Irsyad in Salatiga. Accreditation is not merely a ‘rubber stamp’ legitimizing the Salafi 
credentials of a school, but consists of a thorough examination of the curriculum and 
facilities in order to ensure a certain degree of competency (many Salafi schools have 
not reached this level). Receiving accreditation is an issue of pride that holds reso-
nance not only amongst Salafis, but also very often within wider educational circles.
Quantitatively, however, the number of persons able to study in Saudi Arabia re-
mains small and so for those wishing to continue their religious studies but unable 
to go abroad, the online Al-Madinah International University (MEDIU) provides a 
‘virtual’ alternative. Originally founded in Madinah in 2004, the university has been 
relocated to Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia and received official accreditation from 
the Malaysian government in 2007. At present, MEDIU provides a variety of degrees 
up to doctoral level in both Arabic and English through online classes and test centers 
located across the globe. Accreditation by the Malaysian government may create the 
impression that MEDIU is part of some wider ‘global’ phenomenon, but this is far 
from the case. Saudi shareholders and academics remain both in financial and mana-
gerial control as all seven shareholders and five of the seven board members originate 
from the kingdom. Nevertheless, for Salafis throughout Yogyakarta, the institution 
provides an important ‘virtual’ place of study. 
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The facilitation of links with Saudi Arabia is further assisted through Indonesians 
physically located in Saudi Arabia. It is not uncommon for Indonesian religious stu-
dents to organize Islamic talks for their fellow co-patriots in the kingdom. One infor-
mant provides an interesting example here. Fluent in English, he used to work in the 
tourism industry, living in Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia as well as working at 
the Hyatt hotel in Jeddah. While in Jeddah, he was invited to Islamic lectures held by 
Indonesians (as he spoke little Arabic). It was here that he slowly began to reassess his 
life and ‘chose’ Salafism. Moreover, through the Indonesian Salafi magazine As-Sun-
nah – which is available in Saudi Arabia – he was able to find an advertisement for a 
religious training program in Solo (anonymous informant, personal communication, 
Solo, 4 April 2012). He provides an interesting example of reversion outside of – but 
linked to – Indonesia, something catalyzed by Indonesian religious students based in 
Saudi Arabia who can provide such classes for their compatriots.4
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE RELIGIOUS IDEAL
The abovementioned linkages between Saudi Arabian religious institutions and 
religious actors in Indonesia, maintained through personal, professional, and even 
virtual ties, are thus integral in augmenting the importance of the Arabian Penin-
sula among Indonesian Muslims interested in the movement. Not only do they in-
crease the resonance of Salafi claims to represent an Islam in line with the practices 
of Islam’s most holy places but also, logistically, they increase access to funding and 
private donations from abroad. Yet, such connections are reified through the dis-
semination of Salafi scholastic works. Publishing houses frequently translate and 
distribute the works of Muhammad Bin Abd’ al-Wahhab, Muhammad Nasir al-Din 
al-Albani, Abd al’ Aziz Bin Baz, Muhammad al-Uthayim, ‘Abd Allah bin Jibrin, and 
Salih al-Fawzan. Initially, these translations were circulated by the LIPIA, although 
it has now spread to an insurmountable number of publishers scattered across the 
archipelago. The International Crisis Group has listed 24 prominent publishers, al-
though the number is a lot higher when one takes smaller operations into account 
(ICG, 2004). For example, At-Turots, YPIA, and Wahdah Islamiyah all publish major 
works by Saudi scholars despite the sometimes small scope of their operations. These 
works, distributed through a network of religious bookstores and fairs as well as out-
side of mosque complexes, are an important part of any course or syllabus. YPIA, 
for example, runs several structured courses for students that include the work of 
Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Abd al’ Aziz Bin Baz, and Muhammad al-Uthayim 
(Lembaga Bimbingan Islam al-Atsary, 2006).
The distribution of the works of Arabian-based ulama also provides insight into 
the modes through which Salafi Islamic authority is constructed in Indonesia. With 
few notable exceptions (like Wahdah Islamiyah), Indonesian Salafi scholars do not 
4 I refer to one becoming Salafi as ‘reversion’ rather than ‘conversion’ on two accounts. Firstly, it refers to 
the fact that, while perhaps lax in the observance of religious principles, this informant acknowledged he 
was born a Muslim. Secondly, Salafi propagation differentiates between bringing lax Muslims back to the 
fold and getting non-Muslims to convert (mualaf). They emphasize different points in their da’wa depend-
ing on one’s religious affiliation. More so, those who are already considered Muslims do not undergo any 
official ‘conversion’ ceremony or the need to officially declare Islam their religion, unlike those who mualaf.
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issue fatwa (religious judgments) of their own, but rather refer to the works, rulings, 
and fatwa of their Arabian-based cohorts. Consequently, Indonesian scholars often 
spend much time learning not only the Qur’an and hadith, but also cross-referenc-
ing fatwa by the abovementioned ulama in order to find adequate answers to the 
concerns of their constituents. For example, in the magazine As-Sunnah No. 7 XV 
November 2011, a woman writes to the editor to ask whether it was permissible to 
get dental braces in order to correct her teeth. The unnamed ustadz, who replied on 
behalf of the magazine stated that, according to a similar question asked to al-Fawzan 
(and recorded in a collection of his fatwa al-Muntaqa min Fatawa Syaikh Shalih al-
Fauzan), this is permissible as long as one’s teeth are abnormal and such dental sur-
gery is not done to ‘beautify’ oneself (‘Hukum Merapikan’, 2011). A reader who asked 
whether one is allowed to eat crocodile meat provides a further example. In this case, 
the ustadz replied that, according to a fatwa given by the Saudi Permanent Commit-
tee for Research and Fatwa (Fatwa No. 5394) and signed by Bin Baz, eating crocodile 
meat is permitted (‘Hukum Makan’, 2012). Indeed, out of the 10 issues of As-Sunnah 
published between October 2011 and September 2012, there were 44 questions print-
ed, 29 of which were answered by direct reference to Saudi Arabian shaykhs, most 
predominantly Bin Baz, Al-Abani, al-Uthayim, and al-Fawzan.
The use of Middle Eastern scholars is not extraordinary for Indonesian Muslims 
in itself. Yet, contemporary Salafism differs from the majority of Indonesian scholars 
as it also refers to specific twentieth century shaykhs who lived within the era of the 
modern Saudi state. Moreover, the heavy reliance on the rulings of Arabian ulama has 
led to a division of roles between these Salafi scholars and their Indonesian contem-
poraries, whose primary task seems to be transplanting and framing such teachings 
within the archipelago. By relinquishing a responsibility to directly issue fatwa or 
deal directly with the issues of constituents without foreign references, Indonesian 
scholars are not ‘shirking their duties’ but rather reifying a discursive position at the 
heart of the movement. Indeed, one of the notable appeals of Salafism is a unique 
clarity as to where one can find and access religious works dealing with all sorts of 
issues (as the question concerning the consumption of crocodile meat above attests 
to). Indonesian scholars play a primary part in transplanting religious concepts into 
Indonesian contexts and social environments, both by socializing the rulings of ula-
ma (often in very intricate ways) and underlining their relevance (and meaning) to 
Indonesians as Muslims.
Importantly, this moves beyond the purely religious and taps into wider issues 
of what a modern and progressive society should look like. Saudi Arabia, not lim-
ited to a center of religious learning, also becomes part of a ‘deeper’ religious imagi-
nary, providing pertinent examples of correct social practice Indonesia could learn 
from. Contrasting Indonesia with Saudi Arabia, Salafi preachers frequently lament 
the ‘backwardness’ and ‘social corruption’ of the former in comparison to the piety, 
social advancement, and modernism (all linked together) of the latter. While not ex-
plicitly referencing any civilizational dialectic (for example, the ‘West’ vs. ‘Islam’), the 
use of Saudi Arabia builds an alternative idea of Islamic modernity that contains the 
advances of ‘Western’ sciences without any of their apparent social or moral decay. 
Indeed, Saudi Arabia, with its alleged religious observance and apparent economic 
wealth, represents a social model they believe Indonesian society can emulate in or-
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der to enact a ‘progressive’ future still in line with the principles of an Islamic past. 
One pivotal example in this regard is offered when examining the issue of Islamic 
terrorism, something Salafis show a particular sensitivity to given accusations that 
they are synonymous with terrorism (for example, see Idahram, 2011). Tackling the 
issue head-on, one article written by Ustadz Anas Burhanuddin describes the sever-
ity of rebelling against the state and the chaos it has caused in Indonesia. While the 
state has done much to curb it, terrorism is a political issue that, he argues, can only 
be addressed in a serious yet ‘Islamic’ manner. He thus elaborates that Saudi Ara-
bia provides a useful insight that could be implemented within Indonesia to combat 
Jama’ah Islamiyah and religious violence more generally. Going into minute detail, 
he outlines how the kingdom combated threats of terrorism in 2003–2004 through 
a media campaign, which included Friday sermons and religious lectures as well as 
providing religious knowledge to those involved in anti-terror actions so they did 
not circumvent Islamic ideals. When extremists were captured, Islamic scholars were 
dispatched to run de-radicalization classes and bring them back to the ‘true’ way of 
Islam, a technique Burhanuddin writes was successful given the rapid fall in terror-
ism. He thus concludes that this example is not only useful for Muslim states like In-
donesia, but those of kafir (non-Muslim) nations too. As he states, “what has already 
brought results in practice for Saudi Arabia will, Insya Allah, also produce results for 
Indonesia” (Burhanuddin, 2011, p. 41).
A further example is evident in an article written by ustadz Erwandi Tarmizi con-
cerning corruption in Indonesia and how to deal with such cases according to Is-
lamic law. Corruption is an extremely pertinent issue within the Indonesian public 
sphere. Tarmizi approaches the topic from a religious disposition analyzing where 
corruption would stand in relation to Saudi Arabia’s fatwa committee. He refers to 
rulings by the fatwa committee in order to assess whether corruption could be clas-
sified as theft and so subject to the hudud that allows ones hand to be cut off. After 
careful consideration, however, he concludes that corruption and theft differ and 
so, under Islamic law, there would be no grounds to implement hudud against cor-
rupt persons. His reasoning follows the line that, as Indonesia has a functioning and 
legitimate government, one must respect the laws in place. Tarmizi’s article provides 
an interesting example of how an Indonesian contemporary issue is viewed by refer-
encing Saudi Arabian shaykhs. While he concludes that cutting of one’s hand or can-
ing is not allowed in this case, he does not rule them out as legitimate punishments 
(Tarmizi, 2012). Furthermore, his final argument that one must respect the decision 
of the Indonesian government is somewhat representative of the political quietist 
approach taken by Salafis not aligned with Jafar Umar Thalib immediately after the 
fall of Suharto. This position is remarkably similar to the political line espoused by 
contemporary Salafis in relation to Saudi authority. 
The two examples underline how Saudi Arabia is more than a base for learned 
scholars and networks; the country itself provides an evident example as how to best 
implement Islamic law in relation to topical concerns. The imaginary potential goes 
much deeper, however, as it also provides an example of modern society that Salafis 
refer to in order to build a bridge between the ‘evils’ of contemporary Indonesian 
society and the idealized Islamic society of the Salaf al-Salih. Perhaps nowhere is 
this more evident than in the public kajian given by ustadz within Yogyakarta. These 
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scholars, many of whom have studied in the Arabian Peninsula, frequently refer to 
the region in order to emphasize what Indonesians should aspire to. In a process that 
perhaps ‘thickens’ how an Islamic ideal would be actualized, such preachers have be-
come adept at utilizing Saudi Arabia as a resource to emphasize their message.
Ridwan Hamidi, a Wahdah Islamiyah preacher, offers a case in point. Holding 
weekly kajian at UGM’s campus mosque, Ridwan lectures on Qur’anic and hadith 
studies over the course of 1 and a half hours. Attended by roughly 100 participants, 
these sessions offer intense lectures of Islamic knowledge and its application/use in 
everyday life. Ridwan, who completed his Bachelor’s degree at the Islamic Univer-
sity of Madinah’s Dakwah and Ushul ad Din faculty (1998) before receiving his Mas-
ters in Fiqih and Ushul Fiqih at the Muhammadiyah University Surakarta, is currently 
completing a further Master's in Fiqih Sunnah at the Medina International University 
(MEDIU) while teaching at the technical-electrical department at UGM. His experi-
ence in Saudi Arabia has given him a unique resource that he utilizes within kajian 
at the campus mosque in order to emphasize the seriousness of Qur’anic studies and 
what they could mean in socio-political terms. For example, he once lamented that 
many Indonesian ulama did not have sufficient Islamic knowledge nor set a good 
example, comparing them to people who had a good motorbike but could not ride it 
properly. He contrasted this to Bin Baz who, despite his prestige, was always humble 
and replied to every individual who wrote to him. In fact, he continued, his experi-
ence in Saudi Arabia was exemplary in highlighting ideal religious morals. Mosque at-
tendance was ‘luar biasa’ (out of the ordinary) as they were always full. He compared 
this to Indonesia, where many people avoided attending the mosque and there was a 
lack of morality among Indonesian women. His style, while talking of this experience 
and concern, was one of lament and reflection, urging his audience to learn from 
Saudi Arabia and, if possible, to visit it for study.
Ridwan was not unique in this instance but utilized a common tool through 
which preachers actualized an idealized world by referencing Saudi Arabia. Abu Mus-
lim, who gives a weekly kajian at UGM’s medical studies faculty, provides a further 
example. Having studied in Yemen and visited Saudi Arabia several times over the 
course of four years, Abu Muslim currently teaches at the ICBB while also conduct-
ing campus kajian in conjunction with YPIA. His lectures at the medical faculty are, 
compared to Ridwan’s classes, aimed at a smaller audience (approximately 12 males 
and an unknown number of females) and cover more basic and foundational issues 
of Islamic learning. The main string of argumentation throughout these lectures 
consisted of the need for Islamic learning and introspection in order to save oneself 
from eternal damnation and the immorality prevalent in (Indonesian) society. In-
deed, when the wider student community was involved in demonstrations against a 
planned government fuel hike, he argued that such worldly concerns only help cause 
friction among the umma.
He further elaborated (on several occasions) that the Indonesian campus, while 
an integral place of learning, was also one of corruption that through the mixing 
of the sexes caused zinah (illegitimate relationships) and desires that distract men 
(and women, presumably) from not only their studies but from religious duty. This in 
turn allegedly contributed to a wider breakdown of society. In Saudi Arabia, however, 
people took time to respect religion and, as such, society lived by a higher standard 
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of morals. On one account, he recollected a personal experience where after Friday 
prayers he was invited back to the homes of strangers to eat together. This, he la-
mented, could never happen in Indonesia, not only because society was riddled with 
selfishness but also because Friday, a day that should be reserved for Muslim prayer, 
was a workday. He continued that, with the exception of several schools in Indonesia 
such as ICBB, people abided by a work calendar linked to Christian worship, an issue 
made all the worse as people were ignorant of this fact. What was needed, in Abu 
Muslim’s opinion, was greater emphasis on religious learning and social codes, and 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen provided not only a feasible model to follow but also empha-
sized the positive social results this would create.
TRANSPLANTING THE LAND OF THE TWO HOLY MOSQUES
The use of Saudi Arabia in such instances offers an insightful example into the 
methods of recomposing, transplanting, and, more specifically, ‘frame bridging’ ex-
emplified in social movement theories. The concept of framing offers a cognitive 
tool for interpreting experience and how a certain ideological position can receive 
meaning. Actors produce, arrange, and disseminate a particular ideological bearing in 
order to achieve a certain amount of resonance among constituents (Benford, Roch-
ford, Snow, & Worden, 1986). At its most basic level, it represents the art of communi-
cating in specific ways, selecting issues and symbols that are of concern to those one 
wishes to reach. For example, Wiktorowicz (2004), in his study of intra-movement 
framing contests between Salafi jihadist and non-jihadist groups, highlights how dif-
ferent factions within a movement can compete for legitimacy through specific tech-
niques, as well as how popular intellectuals contextualize such framing for follow-
ers. By emphasizing the perceived knowledge, character, and logic of its message, a 
movement attempts to assert its authority and resonate its message among potential 
constituents. 
In our case, the frame shifts between the global and the local ‘scale’, in a way where 
globally available resources take on local meaning. Framing in such an instance is 
complex as the movement both consumes existing cultural materials but also pro-
duces new ones influenced by global resources and networks. To offer a global frame, 
these movements need to internalize global symbols for domestic use and diffuse 
modes of contention from the global to the local and back (Tarrow, 2005). Yet, this 
is far from straight forward, but must contain a degree of adaptation, institutional-
ization, and representation dependent on the given locale. Ideas and concepts must 
travel and undergo a process of transplantation, adapting to new contexts and facing 
challenges different from an idea’s point of origin (Bonnefoy, 2011; Said, 1983). In re-
lation to our enquiry, Ridwan and Abu Muslim act as mediums bridging Indonesian 
social issues and a religious ideal through the credibility of their own experiences in 
Saudi Arabia. This moves beyond religious references, but also includes many ‘con-
temporary’ allusions of a modern and pious (Saudi) society. In doing so, they aim to 
move beyond religion as a scholastic and scriptural pursuit to one that becomes a 
living dialogical discourse concerned with all matters of life and society. 
In this regard, a focus on contemporary concerns or on the suggestions to follow 
Saudi models against terrorism or corruption can play an important part in form-
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ing the religious ideal Salafis strive for. I would go even further to say that through 
such references we can see the modes by which Salafis attempt to recreate an ideal 
society based on the first generations of Muslims. It is pivotal to the Salafi imaginary 
in terms of balancing an idealized and selective account of an Islamic past with a 
modern present and future. For several constituents, it provides solutions to social 
concerns, highlighting how following Islamic scripture can enact an apparently just 
and fair society. Thus, it is not uncommon for Salafis – even those who have not been 
to Saudi Arabia – to praise the kingdom as an ideal society. For example, one inter-
viewee who had never been to Saudi Arabia stated that the kingdom was an example 
all Muslims should follow as well as a bastion of stability within a region that had 
become unstable due to events in Syria and wider ‘Shi’a’ subversion. When asked how 
this compared to Indonesia, the interviewee replied that Indonesia certainly was not 
a pious society but nevertheless it had potential, as Muslims were free to practice as 
they wished (anonymous informant, personal communication, Yogyakarta, 28 Febru-
ary 2012). In such instances, the Land of Two Holy Mosques is used as an implicit 
socio-political example of how governmental decisions should be made and relate to 
religion. Salafis highlight their political quietist position, stating the need to respect 
and follow a legitimately based government and so criticize Hizbut Tahrir and the 
Muslim Brotherhood over their concerns with political power (Arif Fathul Ulum bin 
Ahmad Saifullah, 2011). Yet, despite remaining explicitly apolitical, the utilization of 
Saudi Arabia or Saudi-based scholars in order to assess Indonesian policy does imply 
a political stance, where all decisions must be filtered through the works of religious 
scholars in order to judge their legitimacy.
However, concepts and imaginaries remain just that. They may offer examples 
and suggestions, but do little in the way of stating exactly how such programs could 
be implemented or enacted within Indonesia (besides through an increase in piety). 
The use of Saudi Arabia, consequently, fails to move beyond complementing the 
normative set of values they set out to enact in the first instance. Moreover, their 
imaginary element not only lies in their suggestive nature of how Indonesian society 
should act, but also in the fact that they rarely move beyond an idealization of Saudi 
society and entwine with the socio-political realities and religious complexities of the 
kingdom. For example, little mention is made of the plight of Indonesian and foreign 
workers in the kingdom, nor of a series of diplomatic spats throughout 2011 and 2012 
concerning the beheading of an Indonesian woman that led to protests outside the 
Saudi embassy in July 2011 and a government embargo on sending maids to Saudi 
Arabia. Underlining their detachment from these issues, Salafis remained quiet, even 
actively ignoring such issues when brought up. The same interviewee mentioned 
above, when asked about his opinion concerning this controversy (as it was in the 
news), became dismissive, stressing how hotheaded Indonesians could be and then 
quickly ended the conversation (anonymous informant, personal communication, 
Yogyakarta, 28 February 2012).
The ability of such imaginaries to move beyond the normative is further inhibited 
by the fact that actors do not exist in a religious vacuum, but have to contend with a 
variety of religious agents, both old and new. Salafism, far from being either a decon-
textualized movement or form of ‘Saudization’ is, borrowing Hepp’s (2009) use of the 
term, translocal. As Hepp argues – and I have attempted to emphasize through the 
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idea of framing and transplantation – the local remains important, as it is the place 
where the availability of global resources is reflected in the form of locally appropri-
ated cultural codes and meaning. Localities do not dissolve but provide a reference 
point for ongoing globalization processes, highlighting the increasing connectivity 
between different spaces all over the world (Hepp, 2004 in Hecker, 2010, pp. 325–
339). What Salafism thus represents is the recomposition of religious resources that 
disembed themselves from any singular territory before recombining within the lo-
calities of Indonesia through the work of grounded actors. The imaginary element of 
Saudi Arabia is thus part of the global resource utilized by activists in order to frame 
a contemporary problem and social issues and a ‘perfect’ Islamic society of the past. 
While I believe this implies that actors gear many of their activities towards the 
local, this does not render the ‘imaginary of Saudi society’ as irrelevant or merely 
contradictory. I believe the use of such examples attests to a method of embedding a 
set of values based on transcendental salvation within the temporal and geographic 
landscape in which agents work. References to Islam’s geographical heartland, and 
the institutions of study and religion within them, provide Salafism with a degree of 
legitimacy in their claim to represent ‘correct tradition’. It is part of a meshing of Salafi 
networks, actors, texts, and other non-Salafi forces that sustain the ideals of ‘piety’ in 
a variety of different contextual settings. In Indonesia, its agents thus put forward 
the idea of a modern religious society at odds with the ‘moral decay’ and ‘backward-
ness’ of Indonesia. Yet, this ideal itself is (and has to be) continually disrupted given 
that it is refracted through the local – responding to concerns of potential followers, 
opponents, with wider forces of public opinion and governance – to a point where 
the imaginary ideal can never be fully actualized. Saudi Arabia, or the idealized image 
of it, rather plays the part of a utopic goal, an aspiration (if only everyone followed 
religion properly) that is never realistically attainable. This perhaps mirrors Derrida’s 
(2006) affirmation of a group’s need for an “unpredictable future to come” where, de-
spite knowing what an idealized future may hold or what the blue print for it should 
be, exactly when and where it can be established in the “here and now” remains an 
uncertain aspiration. Indeed, as Derrida states, “not only must one not renounce the 
emancipatory desire” but “it is necessary to insist on it more than ever” (p. 94). 
The examples of a ‘perfect society’ built upon personal piety and social values – 
imagined through reference to Saudi Arabia in opposition to Indonesian social ills – 
forms part of this “emancipatory desire”, an image constantly insisted upon but never 
fully reachable. However, obtaining the goal is not the point. Rather, the utilization 
of Saudi Arabia as a worldly utopia provides an earthly face that pious individuals can 
strive towards. One should therefore not view the fact that there is no ‘decontextu-
alized’ or perfect Salafism (based on an idealized Saudi example) as testament to its 
failure. The examples highlighted in this paper point to the useful reference and role 
Saudi Arabia plays in providing an imagined but ‘real’ solution to how piety should be 
enacted. Consequently, this gives Salafis a unique point upon which to build claims of 
legitimacy and underscore the temporal rewards for religious exactitude.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The relationship between Salafi religious discourse and the imagined ideal of the 
Arabian Peninsula provides an interesting case study of both socio-political imagi-
naries and contemporary religious movement. Representing a broad multi-layered 
social movement enriched through the lived experiences and debates of its agents, 
it is difficult to talk of one singular unifying Salafism. It has spread throughout the 
world, defined by its adherents as a search for religious ‘purity’. Yet, despite the mul-
tivariate ways it has been enacted and embodied, there is a high level of coherency in 
terms of drawing from similar scholars and institutions within the Arabian Peninsu-
la. Moreover, as is the case in Yogyakarta, the kingdom is more than an institutional 
heartland; it becomes an imagined ideal through which socio-political solutions and 
a picture of a perfect religious community are described. Juxtaposed against the ‘so-
cial ills’ of Indonesian society, such as corruption and terrorism, it forms a pivotal 
resource through which preachers stress the importance and benefits of correct re-
ligious behavior. However, while Saudi Arabia may give such Salafi imaginary values 
a nuance of physical resonance, these same imaginaries often ignore the complexi-
ties of the Saudi religious field or political developments within the kingdom. Yet, 
providing an accurate account of Saudi Arabia is not the point. Rather, it remains an 
image utilized as a resource not only to ‘thicken’ descriptions as to what an embodied 
piety would mean socially, but also to provide Salafi discourse with a greater degree 
of proximity to Islam’s holy sites. It thus becomes a desire, constantly insisted upon 
if impossible to enact. 

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